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utility function, featuring independence between the returns from ordinary consumption and
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omy, and undercuts the process of economic development. We also show that the magnitude
of the effects strongly depends on the assumed preferences.
JEL classification: E21; I12; O10
Keywords: Ordinary consumption; health investment; saving; non-parametric estimation
UNU-MERIT Working Papers
ISSN 1871-9872
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and
Technology, UNU-MERIT
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of
research carried out at the Centre to stimulate discussion on the issues raised.
∗This study has immensely benefited from the comments of Raouf Boucekkine, Noel Bonneuil, Matteo Cervel-
lati, Miguel Perez-Nievas, David de la Croix and Fre´de´ric Dufourt. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Corresponding author: T.T. Azomahou UNU-MERIT, Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TCMaastricht, The Nether-
lands. Tel +31 433 884 440, Fax +31 433 884 499, E-mail: azomahou@merit.unu.edu
1
.2
1 Introduction
‘... These efforts will also uncover some so far unmeasured positive return
– in the way of greater health and longevity, greater mobility,
more leisure, less income inequality and the like.’
(Kuznets, 1973)
One of the most challenging tasks policy makers are facing in both developed and devel-
oping countries is the design of an ‘efficient’ health care system to improve population welfare.
In the US for instance, this unachieved goal is commonly acknowledged to be as high a priority
as that of Administration. In Europe where health care systems have already been put to the
test, inefficiency usually leads governments to regularly introduce a variety of new schemes (gen-
eralization of generic drugs, dropped from the market of inefficient drugs, obligation for people
to have a family doctor, etc.) in order to reduce health spending and to improve the health care
system. In the developing world, the economic consequences of diseases like AIDS, Malaria, etc.
(sharp decline in life expectancy, fall in productivity, etc.) reinforced the idea of formulating a
well adapted health care system without large long-run costs in terms of income per capita as re-
cently pointed out by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Understanding the economic mechanisms
that drive the design and implementation of such policies is a key issue. The aim of this study is
to highlight some of these economic mechanisms, mainly those related to ordinary consumption,
savings and the financing of health expenditure within the face of epidemic shocks.
Improvement of health is an important social and economic objective, which has obvious
direct returns in the sense it favors longer and better life, but also a large indirect effect through
the acceleration of economic growth.1 Among the well known indicators of health status in
a country, mortality and life expectancy are the usual candidates, each of them with their
advantages and drawbacks. In fact, the interplay between economic growth and health has been
and still is a source of important debate in the literature since evidently, health is a human
capital. In an illuminating assessment of this question, Sen (1998) pointed out the crucial
connection between mortality and growth, and highlighted the ability of countries to reduce
mortality as a test of their economic performance. Sen (1998) also outlined that the forces that
contribute to an increase or a reduction of mortality often have economic causes.2 Moreover, the
increase of health expenditures in both developed and developing countries calls for a debate
on health policies focusing on limiting the growth of health spending as a rational response
to changing economic conditions notably the growth of income per capita as life expectancy
increases. The role of health expenditure in improving longevity was recently studied by Hall
and Jones (2007) who showed that spending on health to improve longevity led individuals to
procure additional periods of utility, and that the marginal utility of life extension does not
decline.3
This paper contributes to the current debate by highlighting the behavior of consumption
and health investment under epidemic shock with a special emphasis on the financing of health
expenditure. In this set up, we consider two specifications for the preferences: i) a specification
where consumption and health capital enter additively in the utility function, and ii) the case
of non-additive preferences meaning that ordinary consumption is also crucial for health.
In Grossman’s (1972) standard model, health is considered as a capital stock that increases
with investment, by buying into health services, medical goods, or spending time on health
related activities. However, it also decreases naturally through the ageing process. As pointed
out by Gjerde et al. (2001), there are three key reasons why people want to improve health:
1See e.g., Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) for a nice contribution to the debate.
2See also Cervelatti and Sunde (2005, 2008) and de la Croix (2008).
3See the recent study of Dolan and Kahnemann (2008) on interpretations of utility in the context of non-market
goods such as health. See also Bleichrodt and Pinto (2005) for some applications of non-expected utility in the
health area.
i) Since health directly enters the individual’s utility, it can be considered as a consumption
commodity.
ii) Health determines the total amount of time available for monetary and non-monetary
activities. Therefore it is an investment commodity.
iii) Being healthy lengthens the life span and lessens the likelihood of premature mortality.
Thus health is a determinant factor of longevity.
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) specified a demand function for quantity and quality of life. Their
model is based on Grossman (1972)’s type specification using the consumption-investment com-
modity aspect of health. The authors calculated that optimal health and longevity are correlated
to the endowment of wealth, rather than necessarily current income. Gjerde et al. (2001) ana-
lyzed the impact of adaptating to a falling health state on the demand for health and medical
care by integrating adaptation processes in the pure consumption model of Grossman (1972).
They also introduced the uncertainty of longevity and their simulation experiments showed that
adaptation affects health by lowering the incentives to invest in health, as well as smoothening
the optimal health stock path over life cycle.
One key feature in the traditional modeling strategy a la Grossman is that preferences are
separable in health and ordinary consumption. As a result, the returns from these two goods are
independent. However, recent evidence stressed the fact that ordinary consumption is also crucial
for health. According to the World Health Organization 2002 report, while overweight status
and obesity coexist with stunting and micronutrient malnutrition, undernutrition has long been
considered to represent both a consequence and cause of poor human health, underdevelopment,
and underachievement throughout life.4 Undernutrition with respect to energy, protein, etc. can
adversely affect the quality of life, impair resistance to infection and diseases, and decrease span
of life.
At this stage of our motivation, let us briefly put forward some specific aspects of health
which may help understanding of our approach. Epidemics and malnutrition often occur in
tandem. Indeed, poor nutrition increases the risk and progression of disease and in turn, disease
exacerbates malnutrition. Curtis (2004) outlined a possible relationship between nutrition and
scarlet fever. The author suggested that poor nutrition during pregnancy may have caused
women to give birth to children who were particularly susceptible to scarlet fever.5 On the other
hand, according to the World Initiative for Soy in Human Health (WISHH), ‘HIV/AIDS-infected
people may need 50-100% more protein than uninfected people.’ Bobat et al. (1997) studied
prenatal HIV-infected children in Italy. The authors concluded that breastfeeding not only
protects infants from common childhood illnesses, but it also could slow down the progression
to AIDS for HIV-infected children. However, the advantages of breastfeeding were lost by the
time children reached five years of age.6 d’Albis and Augeraud-Ve´ron (2008) considered that
the dynamics of optimal prevention depends on the relationship between the epidemiological
characteristics of disease, labor productivity and intergenerational equity. They demonstrated
that a minimal level of labor productivity is necessary to reduce the prevalence rate of the
epidemic in the long-run. Boucekkine and Laffargue (2008) developed a general theory to study
the economic and demographic impact of epidemics. The authors characterized analytically the
short and medium run consequences of epidemics for population size, age pyramid, economic
performance and income distribution.7
Many factors may contribute to disease evolution making the identification of single causes
very difficult. However, the observations above suggest that improved nutrition and the prompt
4See e.g. the recent study of Nonnemaker et al. (2008).
5See e.g. Blaum (2005) for an empirical assessment of the role of pregnancy employment on health at birth.
6See also Tanaka (2005) for a study of the interplay between parental leave and child health.
7See also Boucekkine et al. (2008), Geoffard and Philipson (1996,1997), Gersovitz and Hammer (2004,2005),
Kremer (1996).
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treatment of infections in HIV infected individuals may delay the onset of AIDS. There is evi-
dence from several studies that macronutrients play a role in HIV disease progression. Friis and
Michaelsen (1998) focused on HIV-infected men in the USA. They suggested that high intakes
of riboflavin, vitamin E and iron, and possibly vitamin A, C and thiamin were associated with
reduced disease progression. Moreover, Fawzi et al. (1998) produced data from a randomized,
controlled vitamin A trial among pre-school children with acute pneumonia in Tanzania. They
concluded that vitamin A prolonged the life expectancy of the HIV infected, suggesting that
vitamin A may play a role in slowing the course of HIV infection in children.
VanMaanen (1988) led two exploratory studies with elderly US and UK people in various
age-groups. He found that the perception of health, by the self proclaimed ‘healthy’ elderly
American was more ‘a state of mind’. Whereas the ‘un-healthy’ elderly British person interpreted
it as ‘the state of absence of disease’. In each case, health maintenance behavior patterns valued
were: balanced nutrition and physical exercise, etc. Subsequently, good nutrition throughout
adult life will help protect against diseases such as diabetes, coronary heart problems, strokes
and some cancers. For instance, the March 2003 report of the East Midlands Regional Assembly
stated that, healthy eating could lead to a 20% reduction in deaths from chronic diseases, and
appropriate dietary advice can prevent physical and mental deterioration, and improve the
quality of life of older people.
Studies on human capital allow us to analyze the effects of nutrition on labor productivity.
Fogel (1997) stated that nutritional improvements contributed to between 20 and 30% of the
income per capita growth in England during 1780-1979. The functionality of the individual and
his capacity to work in a productive way depended partly on her/his nutrition. In the same way,
Seshadri and Tara (1989) showed that in India, iron deficiency in children affects their cognitive
capacity and their performance at school. Therefore, consumption of un-healthy goods plays an
important role when addressing health.
In this study, we consider a model in which marginal utility of consumption depends on
health capital and vice-versa. For simplification, we consider that the lifetime of individuals
is infinite, thus removing any uncertainty on that side. However this facet of our approach
is closely related to the framework of Grossman (1972) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) in that
health capital is still a determinant of lifetime utility. In this complex, we study agents’ behavior
facing an epidemic shock which either accelerates the depreciation of health capital or decreases
the productivity or efficiency of investment in health.
At a first glance, one may observe that these two actions are interconnected but we cannot
make conclusions about the net effects on health investment. Hence, it will be very difficult, at
least analytically, to slice on the net effect of a high health deterioration rate and low health
productivity on health investment. It is important to note that not all diseases have the same
effects on individuals. For instance, we can distinguish between virulent epidemics which can
kill in a very short period of time, and strongly affect an individual’s health capital and life
expectancy on the one hand and epidemics which do not kill in the short term, but confine
people to bed, or constitute a handicap for the rest of their life on the other.8 Therefore, to
simplify and to avoid potential ambiguities in our modelling which entails the analysis of all
factors, including epidemics that can undermine health capital, we assume that we have two
separate and different epidemic shocks: one that accelerates the health deterioration rate, and
another that decreases the efficiency of health investment.
One of the main economic implications of an epidemic is a probable and significant dis-
tortion in saving behavior. For example Freire (2002) studied the impact of AIDS on household
savings in South Africa. The author found that the pandemic, and the associated sharply declin-
8Among those diseases we can quote Plague, Spanish Influenza, Cholera, Meningitis, Virus of Marburg (dis-
covered in Marburg in the north of Germany in 1967). The second kind of epidemic can be assimilated to endemic
diseases. The effect of these diseases is that, many people die but many people survive but are reduced to poverty
because of the loss of productivity, and their lives are blighted by frequent bouts of illness. Among them we find
AIDS, paludism, Leishmaniasis (the second-largest parasitic killer in the world after malaria).
2
ing life expectancy is likely to shift savings downward for a while, therefore restricting economic
growth and standard of living in the medium and long-run. Chakraborty (2004) considered the
problem of public investment in health within the framework of overlapping generation models.
The author showed that in poor countries where life expectancy is weak, individuals are more
likely to discount the future and thus less inclined to save. Cuddington and Hancock (1994)
also stated that, health expenditure induces a decrease in savings at the expense of capital ac-
cumulation. However, this is questionable since health expenditure is detrimental to ordinary
consumption. Therefore, there is an overriding issue as to how to deal with savings in the context
of epidemics.9
In this paper, we provide new non-parametric evidence on the relation between life ex-
pectancy and health expenditure. Then, we pay particular attention to the way health enters the
utility function, and to the impact of epidemics on saving decisions, investment in health capital
and ordinary consumption. We shall see that the picture is quite sophisticated, depending on the
preferences postulated. The chief outcome of this paper demonstrates that a shock undermining
health (increasing health expenditure and weakening the income base), not only affects savings,
but also compromises the consumption capacity as well as the human and physical capital of
the economy undercutting the process of economic development. We show that the magnitude
of these effects depends on the assumed preferences.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. To support our theoretical framework,
Section 2 presents empirical outlines and estimation results. We provide a brief literature review
of empirical findings and then we propose a non-parametric analysis of the interplay between
health expenditure and life expectancy. Section 3 studies the benchmark model with separable
health and consumption. Section 4 is devoted to the alternative model with multiplicative
interaction between health and ordinary consumption. In both cases, we deal with a general
equilibrium framework. Section 5 summarizes our findings and Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Empirical background
In the previous section, we emphasize the importance of the connection between health invest-
ment and life expectancy. In this section, we would like to say a little bit more and elaborate
on some empirical facts. Over the last few centuries, it has been recognized that improvements
in health care are the main driving force of life expectancy in both developed and developing
countries. How does health care spending impact life expectancy? Firstly, we provide a short
literature review on some empirical facts and then, we provide an empirical non-parametric
examination of the relationship between health expenditure and life expectancy, accounting for
possible endogeneity issues (or feedback effects). Up till now, empirical contributions have been
based on parametric specifications (see e.g, Shaw et al., 2005) which may have the drawback of
skipping out non-linearities inducing severe mis-specification problems.
2.1 A brief review of some facts
There are several channels through which diseases can affect the economy. Some recent contri-
bution have advocated the human capital channel. For example, Corrigan et al. (2005) have
used a calibrated OLG model to analyze the effect of the drop in life expectancy on investment.
They found a significant increase in the number of orphans as a result of AIDS. McDonald and
9Looking at this from a different perspective, Acharya and Balvers (2004) revisited the concept of intertemporal
preferences replacing the unobservable concept of utility function by an observable health function. They showed
that the rate of time preference varies in an intuitive way with changes in conditional lifetime, initial wealth age,
and the marginal productivity of consumption in affecting health. Dusansky and Koc¸ (2006) emphasized the role
of uncertainty examining the interconnection between individual consumer’s demand for medical care and choice
of health insurance coverage (see also Cameron et al., 1988 and Dardanoni and Wagstaff, 1990). It is worthwhile
to mention that those aspects of the issue are out of the scope of this study.
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Roberts (2006) used an econometric model combining growth and health capital equations.10
Applied on African countries, the model predicted the substantial effects of the epidemic: the
marginal impact on income per capita of a one percent increase in HIV prevalence rate is minus
0:59%. The authors concluded that while the human and social costs of the HIV/AIDS epidemic
are major causes for concern, their results indicate that the macroeconomic effects of the epi-
demic are by no way negligible. Thornton (2008) evaluated an experiment in which individuals
in rural Malawi were randomly assigned monetary incentives to learn their HIV results after
being tested.
In a highly controversial paper, Young (2005) claimed that AIDS severely lowers fertility
for two main reasons: On the one hand, the epidemic has undoubtedly reduced willingness to
engage in unprotected sexual activity. On the other, the high mortality of adult males and
the resulting scarcity of labor are likely to increase the value a woman’s availability. Both
channels are arguably strong enough to induce a long-lasting decrease in fertility, which may
cause future consumption per capita to rise. Using a Barro-Becker based empirical model,
the author found that in the case of South-Africa, this decreasing fertility engine is so strong
that it dominates the human capital channel put forward by Corrigan et al. (2005). Hence,
AIDS might well be interpreted as a ‘gift of the dying’ for future South African generations.
Nonetheless, such a finding has been challenged by some authors, including the very interesting
paper of Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) who studied the fertility issues on a panel of 44 African countries
between 1985-2000. The author showed that the HIV/AIDS epidemic affects the total fertility
rate positively and the school enrollment rates negatively.
Several studies have elaborated on the relevance of the interdependence between health
investment, life expectancy and economic growth as well as outlining the crucial role of public
policies. In this respect, country historical figures are very interesting to put forward. As
outlined by Jones (2001), in 1998, the U.S. spent 13.% of its GDP on goods and services related
to health care which represents a big increase compared to the 5.1% spending in 1960. The
1998 spending shares were 10.6% in Germany, 9.6% in France, 9.5% in Canada, 7.4% in Japan,
and 6.7% in the U.K. At the same time, the pattern of life expectancy increase is the opposite,
considering that U.S. life expectancy at birth was 57.1 years in 1929, 68.2 years in 1950 and up
to 75.5 years by 1990.
Shaw et al. (2005) studied life expectancy production function for a sample of OECD
countries using a parametric specification. The authors found that pharmaceutical consumption
has positive impact on life expectancy for middle age and older. Shaw et al. (2005) also noted
that this relation is sensitive to age distribution. Peltzman (1987) used a GLS regression of life
expectancy at birth on wealth and government health spending and found only health to be a
significant determinant. Miller and Frech (2000) used OECD age strata data and found that
the determinants of life expectancy in each stratum regression were wealth, pharmaceutical and
non-pharmaceutical medical expenditures.
The literature also provides strong evidence support as to how healthiness is closely con-
nected to economic development. Gallup and Sachs (2001) argued that wiping out malaria in
sub-Saharan Africa could increase the continent’s per capita growth rate by as much as 2.6%
by year. In the U.S. between 1980 and 2000, the annual number of deaths fell by 16%, life ex-
pectancy increased across all age groups by an average of 5%, and the number of hospital days
fell by 56%.11 Additionally, using the value of a statistical life method12, the Medical Technol-
ogy Assessment and Policy (MEDTAP) revealed in their 2002 report that, annual health care
10See also Bloom and Mahal (1997) for a very careful econometric study on the effect of epidemics on economic
growth.
11However, as noticed by Bhargava et al. (2001), life expectancy in a country is a broad measure of population
health, though it needs not accurately reflect the productivity of the labor force.
12The value of life is the cost of reducing the (average) number of deaths by one. When deciding on the
appropriate level of health care spending, a typical method is to equate the marginal cost of the health care to
the marginal benefits received. In order to obtain a marginal benefit amount, some estimation of the dollar value
of life is required.
4
expenditure per person increased by $2,254 in the U.S. between 1980 and 2000. This report also
stated that for every additional $1 spent on health care, the value of health gains ranged from
$2.40 to $3.00, and at least a 40% increase in life expectancy is directly attributable to addi-
tional health care. However, as mentioned by Hall and Jones (2007) how much of this increase
is exactly due to increased health spending is unclear, but the large gains in life expectancy
clearly represent one of the major accomplishments of the 20th century. One way to explain for
this increase in share of health expenditure should be to consider health as a superior good. As
people get richer, consumption rises but they devote an increasing share of resources to health
care.13
It worthwhile to note that all the above mentioned empirical contributions are based on
parametric specifications, which may have the potential drawback of mis-specification. In what
follows, we provide a non-parametric appraisal of the relation between life expectancy and health
expenditure.
2.2 Non-parametric analysis
The complex interdependence between health care spending and life expectancy advocates the
empirical modelling of the relationship using a flexible non-parametric framework. By focusing
on the effect of health expenditure, it is not our intention to deny the role of other determinants
of life expectancy. We are aware that not allowing for all possible determinants such as wealth,
lifestyle variables (alcohol, tobacco, etc.), GDP, age distribution, etc., may be viewed as a
limitation. However, several arguments can be put forward in support of our choice.
The first and obvious one, concerns the methodology. In this respect, it is important to
note that using panel methods sweeping country effects away allows us to control implicitly for
any time invariant determinant. The second obvious and more important point is that, we are
not concerned here with obtaining the paramount predictions for life expectancy but with the
shape of the relationship between the latter and health expenditure. In this respect, determinants
of life expectancy which are not correlated with health expenditure become irrelevant. Moreover
the impact of determinants which are correlated with health expenditure (for example GDP,
age distribution, lifestyle variables such as consumption of alcohol and tobacco) will be captured
via health expenditure.14 Depending on the question asked, this can be seen as a drawback or
as an advantage. It is a drawback if we purport to determine the ceteris paribus impact of
health expenditure on life expectancy – but what list of regressors would guarantee this? It is
an advantage if we are interested in the global effect of health expenditure, including indirect
effects linked with omitted variables. Finally, we truly believe that over last few centuries,
improvements in health care are the main driving force of life expectancy in both developed and
developing countries.15
13Newhouse (1992) has pointed out the crucial role played by the development of new technologies in the rise
of health spending. In fact, the invention of new and expensive medical technologies causes health spending to
rise over time.
14Remark: in our case, as will be described in the data section, we use health expenditure in percentage of GDP.
In that case, there is a clear strong correlation between health variable and GDP which prevents the use of GDP
as additional regressor. As regard to age distribution, it is obvious that the same is likely to be highly correlated
with health expenditure. For instance it is well known that ageing populations usually need more health care than
younger population. The same can be applied to lifestyle variables. Indeed, consumption of alcohol and tobacco
are likely to increase health expenditure whereas regular physical exercises could reduce health expenditure and
lengthens the life span.
15As outlined in Kirkwood (2008), during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the increase in life
expectancy was driven mainly by improvements in sanitation, housing and education, causing a steady decline
in early and mid-life mortality, which was chiefly due to infections. This trend continued with the development
of vaccines and then antibiotics. By the latter half of the twentieth century, there was little room for further
reduction in early and mid-life mortality. The continuing increase is due almost entirely to a new phenomenon:
the decline in late-life mortality as a consequence of health improvement.
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2.2.1 Data
We use unbalanced panel data including both developed and developing countries spanning
the period 1960-2000. Life expectancy data is extracted from the World Development Indica-
tors database. Health expenditure data is collected from the Health, Nutrition and Population
database. We use total health expenditure in percentage of GDP. Total expenditure on health is
defined as the sum of expenditure on activities that – through application of medical, paramed-
ical, and nursing knowledge and technology – have the objective of: i) promoting health and
preventing disease; ii) curing illness and reducing premature mortality; iii) caring for persons
affected by chronic illness who require nursing care; iv) caring for persons with health-related
impairments, disability, and handicaps who require nursing care; v) assisting patients to die with
dignity; vi) providing and administering public health; vii) providing and administering health
programmes, health insurance and other funding arrangements. By means of this definition,
general public safety measures such as technical standards monitoring and road safety are not
considered as part of expenditure on health. Activities such as food and hygiene control and
health research and development are considered health-related, but are not included in total
health expenditure.
Insert Table 1 here
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics which take into account the panel structure of
the sample by reporting the decomposition of the standard deviation into, between and within
country magnitudes. The within patterns refer to deviation from each country’s average over
time, whereas the between refers to a country’s average. We observe that the between standard
deviation is approximately more that the double of the within counterpart.
Insert Figure 1 here
To get a precise picture of the distribution of variables, we compute the non-parametric
Kernel16 density estimates. Figure 1 shows a bi-modal distribution for both life expectancy and
health expenditure. There are two quite remarkable features in these distributions. We observe
a high proportion of countries who dedicate a weak part of their GDP to health care spending,
and a weak proportion of countries who dedicate an important part of their GDP to health
care spending. At the same time, a small proportion of countries have a weak density of life
expectation, and a high proportion of countries have a high density of life expectation. The
last picture clearly reflects a stylized fact of the economic and demographic transition. In what
follows, we investigate the interplay between life expectancy and health expenditure.
2.2.2 Econometric specification
We use a Generalized Additive Model (hereafter GAM) for panel data.17 The appeal of the
GAM is that it has the advantage of avoiding the ‘curse of dimensionality’ which appears in
non-parametric regressions when many explanatory variables are accounted for. Moreover, the
statistical properties (optimal rate of convergence and asymptotic distribution) of the estimator
is well known (see e.g., Stone, 1980). The structure of the model is given by
yit =
p∑
j=1
mj(x
j
it) + µi + uit, i = 1, · · · , N, t = 1, · · · , T (1)
where yit denotes the response variable (here life expectancy at birth), x
j
its are j explanatory
variables for j = 1, · · · , p (here x denotes health expenditure), the mj are unknown univariate
16We use the Epanechnikov kernel which is known to have optimal properties (see e.g., Wand and Jones, 1995).
17See e.g., Hastie and Tibshirani (1990) and Stone (1985) for further details on GAM.
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functions to be estimated, µi is unobserved individual specific effects. We assume that errors
uit are independent and identically distributed, but no restriction is placed on the temporal
variance structure. To account for possible endogeneity, that is, potential feedbacks from life ex-
pectancy we use the predeterminedness assumption: E(uit|xit,xi,t−1, . . . ,xi1) = 0, which is fairly
much weaker than the strict exogeneity assumption: E(uit|xi1, . . . ,xiT ) = 0, i = 1, · · · , N, t =
1, . . . , T , often made when working with panel data. Now, observe that the possibility to sweep
away the unobserved effect µi allows us to keep unspecified the joint distribution of xit and µi,
and that of µi and uit. Thus, we make no assumption on E(µi|xi`1 , · · · ,xi`K ) for any set of dates
`1, · · · , `K in {1, · · · , T}18 The unobserved effect µi can be eliminated by first differentiation:
yit − yi,t−1 =
p∑
j=1
mj(x
j
it)−
p∑
j=1
mj(x
j
i,t−1) + eit (2)
where eit = uit − ui,t−1. The first difference assumption (FDA): E(ηit|xjit,xji,t−1) = 0, i =
1, · · · , N, t = 2, · · · , T identifies the functions:
E
[
yit − yi,t−1|xjit,xji,t−1
]
=
p∑
j=1
mj(x
j
it)−
p∑
j=1
mj(x
j
i,t−1) (3)
It should be noted that a special case under which FDA is satisfied is strict exogeneity which
drives the within estimator for parametric panel models (see e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). Moreover,
strict exogeneity would preclude any feedback from the current value of life expectancy on future
values of health expenditure, which is not a realistic hypothesis. It is also worth noting that
predeterminedness is neither necessary nor sufficient for FDA to hold. It is not sufficient since
under predeterminedness alone, we have:
E(eit|xit,xi,t−1, · · · ,xi1) = −E(ui,t−1|xit,xi,t−1, · · · ,xi1)
which will not be null in general.19 This calls for an extension of the predeterminedness yielding
(3): E(uit|xi,t+1,xit,xi,t−1, · · · ,xi1) = 0, i = 1, · · · , N, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 with predeterminedness
still holding for t = T . In our case, this only precludes feedback from the current value of
life expectancy on next year’s value of health expenditure, but not on later values. In other
words, we allow possible feedback from current values of life expectancy on values of health
expenditure starting from t+ 2, which thus appears as a fairly weak condition compared to the
strict exogeneity. In practice, we base our estimation on the ‘smooth backfitting algorithm’ (see
e.g., Mammen et al., 1999 and Nielsen and Sperlich, 2005). We denote mˆ(xit) and mˆ(xi,t−1) the
estimates of m(xit) and m(xi,t−1) respectively.
2.2.3 Estimation results
Estimation results of relation (2) based on the extended predeterminedness assumption are
reported in Figure 2. A first glance of estimates gives the impression that the effect of health
expenditure on life expectancy is highly non-linear. To go beyond this first impression, we test for
the significance of non-linearity in the econometric specification. We use the ‘gain’ statistic (see,
Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990 for details).20 The ‘gain’ is computed as 90.74 > χ2(18.998) = 10.11
18See Arellano and Honore´ (2001, Chap. 53).
19Notice that this will be zero under the strict exogeneity assumption.
20The ‘gain’ is the difference in normalized deviance between the GAM and the parametric linear model. A
large ‘gain’ indicates a lot of non-linearity, at least as regard the statistical significance. The distribution of this
statistic is approximated by a chi-square χ2 (df = dfg − dfl), where dfg denotes the degree of freedom of the GAM.
It is computed as the trace of 2S− SS′ where S is the smoothing matrix, and dfl is the degree of freedom of the
parametric linear model. Here we use the first difference linear model yit − yi,t−1 = β(xit − xi,t−1) + εit − εi,t−1,
which is then estimated by ordinary least squares. In that case, S turns out to be the matrix of orthogonal
projection: S = Z (Z′Z)−1 Z′, where Z denotes the matrix of regressors which does stack up elements of xit−xi,t−1.
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at the 5% level. As a result, there is a strong evidence of non-linearity which means that our
approximation is preferred to the linear specification.
Insert Figure 2 here
Our empirical specification is flexible enough to account for the complex way health ex-
penditure impacts life expectancy. The key message which emerges from Figure 2 is that the
relationship between life expectancy and health expenditure, while roughly increasing, has quite
varying concavity depending on the value of health expenditure. Let us consider the two graphs
mˆ(xit) and mˆ(xi,t−1) within the range of significancy (i.e., range where the confidence bands
do not contained the zero line). In the case of mˆ(xit), we observe that for low values of health
expenditure, an additional increase in the same will firstly reduce life expectancy. This reduction
is followed by a strong increase of life expectancy for intermediate values of health expenditure.
The curve becomes flat within the range of significancy for high values of health expenditure.
The experience of life expectancy with respect to low values of health expenditure is quite
surprising. In fact we can imagine, as outlined by Sen (1998) – when comparing growth of GDP
per head and life expectancy – the explanation of our result lies in a lagged relation, so that
increases in health expenditure can be seen as determining the corresponding life expectancy
increase in the future. Indeed, this is now clearly observed in the graph of mˆ(xi,t−1) where the
decreasing part previously observed in the graph of mˆ(xit) no longer appears.
Hereafter, we study the effects on subsequent life cycle of long-lived shocks undermin-
ing health with either an acceleration of health capital deterioration, or a decrease in health
investment efficiency.
3 The benchmark model
Most studies investigating the interaction between health and the ways it affects utility, use
an additive structure, that is health status and ordinary consumption are additively separable
in the utility function. Our first approach consists in exploring this framework. However, in
contrast to the literature, we add a final good sector to better understand the life cycle aspect
of the issue. In doing so, we assume that the marginal utility of consumption is independent
from health status. However, this assumption is questionable since, as we stated previously,
health and consumption are interrelated. Therefore we first introduce this primary approach as
a benchmark. In the next section, we will relax this supposition by considering a specification
that accounts for the fact that health and consumption are correlated. Health status is a broad
concept, it goes beyond the mere presence or absence of disease. In our case, the term health
status refers to the general health situation of the individual.21
3.1 The consumer’s problem
We assume (like Hall and Jones, 2007) that health status and consumption at time z are addi-
tively separable in utility. Then the agent has to maximize the following lifetime utility∫ ∞
z
V (C(z),M(z))e−ρsds =
∫ ∞
z
[U(C(z)) + ϕ(M(z))] e−ρsds (4)
where V (C(z),M(z)) is the instantaneous utility derived from consumption goods C(z), and
stock of health capital M(z), and ρ is the time preference rate. We assume that ϕ(M(z)) is an
strictly increasing and concave function in M , and can be considered as the amount of healthy
time. The law of motion of non-human assets and health are respectively given by
A˙(z) = r(z)A(z) + w(z)− C(z)−m(z) (5)
M˙(z) = ψ(m(z))− δMM(z) (6)
21Indeed, the way people report their health status is directly related to their use of medical services, which
include visits to doctors or dentists, hospital stays, medicinal prescription, etc.
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where r(z) is the interest rate. We assume that each individual supplies one unit of work per unit
of time, then w(z) is the wage rate, m(z) is the flow of gross investment in stock of health capital
M(z). The health investment m(z) is produced with a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology
via the function ψ(m(z)).
Consistent with Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), we consider that the stock of health capital can
be maintained or increased through purposive investments m(z). However, health is submitted
to a natural biological deterioration at the rate δM . Thus, in contrary to Ehrlich and Chuma
(1990), we assume a constant rate of health depreciation. However, the greater the health that
one intends to maintain in later years, the earlier one must initiate significant investments in
counteracting the depreciation of health.
Individuals maximize lifetime utility (4), subject to the state variables A˙(z) and M˙(z) in
equations (5) and (6) respectively. The Hamiltonian and optimality conditions of this optimal
control problem are
J = [U(C(z)) + ϕ(M(z))] e−ρz
+ λAe−ρz [r(z)A(z) + w(z)− C(z)−m(z)]
+ λMe−ρz [ψ(m(z))− δMM(z)]
The first order conditions (hereafter FOC) associated to this problem are given as:
∂J
∂C(z)
= UCe−ρz − λAe−ρz = 0 (7)
∂J
∂m(z)
= λMψ′(m(z))e−ρz − λAe−ρz = 0 (8)
∂J
∂M(z)
= [λ˙M − ρλM ]e−ρz = λMδMe−ρz − ϕ′(M(z))e−ρz (9)
∂J
∂A(z)
= e−ρz[ρλA − λ˙A] = r(z)λAe−ρz =⇒ λ˙A = λA(ρ− r(z)) (10)
The additional transversality conditions are:
lim
z→∞λA(z)e
−ρzA(z) = 0 (11)
lim
z→∞λM (z)e
−ρzM(z) = 0 (12)
We specify constant-relative-risk-aversion (or CRRA) functions for U(C(z)) and ϕ(M(z)), and
a decreasing return in health investment for function ψ(m(z)) as:
U(C(z)) =
(C(z))1−σ1
1− σ1 (13)
ϕ(M(z)) = b
(M(z))1−σ2
1− σ2 (14)
ψ(m(z)) = pi(m(z))α (15)
with σ1 > 0, σ2 > 0, b > 0 and 0 < α < 1. U(C(z)) and ϕ(M(z)) are strictly increasing and
concave respectively in C(z) and M(z). ψ(m(z)) represents the health investments function,
which is concave in m(z), reflecting the assumed diminishing returns in health investment. pi
is the productivity or efficiency of health investment. Increased health care productivity not
only shifts the health production function upward, but causes each unit of health care to have a
larger contribution to health as well. From Eq. (8) we can derive the marginal value of health
capital relative to the marginal value of ordinary consumption, that is
λM
λA
=
1
ψ′(m(z))
=
1
piα(m(z))α−1
(16)
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Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) also assumed that the consumer is choosing death when his stock
of capital M(z) is under a certain minimal level Mmin. In our setup, we assume Mmin = 0.
By doing so, we end up with a standard infinite time model, provided M(z) ≥ 0, ∀z. This
simplification will allow us to tackle much more comfortably the sophisticated optimization
problem. Equations (7) and (10) yield the traditional Euler relation:
C˙ =
UC(ρ− r)
U ′C
⇒ C˙
C
=
r − ρ
σ1
(17)
From (8) and (9) we obtain:
m˙
m
=
δM + r
1− α −
ϕ′(M)ψ′(m)
(1− α)UC
=
δM + r
1− α −
bM−σ2piαmα−1
(1− α)C−σ1 (18)
The negative sign on the second term of the right hand-side of (18) implies that when the value
of health increases, then health investment goes upward. Indeed, piαmα−1 is the inverse of the
unit value of health which lowers the whole term when this value increases, ensuring an increase
in m. Let us now introduce the firm problem.
3.2 The firm’s problem
We now proceed to the producer side. We consider a representative firm with neoclassical
Cobb-Douglas technology:
F (K,L) = Y (z) = B(z)K(z)ε (L(z))1−ε , 0 < ε < 1
where F (K,L) denotes the production function, Y (z), K (z) and L (z) are respectively output,
capital input and labor input per time unit respectively, while B (z) is the technological level
which growths at a constant rate. Let us denote kˆ = KL the ratio capital labor. Then the output
per labor can be rewritten:
f(kˆ) =
Y (z)
L(z)
= B(z)kˆ(z)ε
The maximization of the profit function under perfect competition allows to equalize the marginal
cost of each factor with its marginal benefit. Therefore,
r(z) = εB(z)kˆ(z)ε−1 − δ (19)
w(z) = f(kˆ(z))− kˆ(z)f ′(kˆ(z)) = (1− ε)B(z)kˆ(z)ε (20)
where δ ≥ 0 is the capital depreciation rate and w is the wage rate. Combining the demand and
the supply sides, we can characterize the equilibrium of the economy as follows.
3.3 Equilibrium
In a closed economy with no public debt, aggregate financial wealth equals, by definition, the
value of the capital stock. This implies that A(z) = K(z) for all z. We can therefore write
˙ˆ
k(z)
kˆ(z)
=
K˙(z)
K(z)
− n = F (K,L)− δK(z)− C(z)−m(z)
K(z)
− n
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and
˙ˆ
k(z) = f(kˆ(z))− Cˆ(z)− mˆ(z)− (δ + n) kˆ(z)
= B(z)kˆ(z)ε − Cˆ(z)− mˆ(z)− (δ + n) kˆ(z) (21)
where Cˆ(z) and mˆ(z) are respectively the consumption and health expenditure per labor, and
n (which for simplicity will be assumed null) is the population growth rate. Therefore, we are
able to summarize the dynamics of the economy by the following non-trivial four dimensional
system:
˙ˆ
C(z)
Cˆ(z)
= r(z)−ρσ1
˙ˆm(z)
mˆ(z) =
δM+r(z)
1−α − bM(z)
−σ2piαm(z)α−1
(1−α)C(z)−σ1
˙ˆ
M(z) = pi(mˆ(z))α − δMMˆ(z)
˙ˆ
k(z) = B(z)kˆ(z)ε − Cˆ(z)− mˆ(z)− δkˆ(z)
(22)
with kˆ(0) and Mˆ(0) given, plus the transversality conditions. The steady-state values of Cˆ, mˆ,
Mˆ , and kˆ are obtained by equalizing ˙ˆC, ˙ˆm, ˙ˆM , ˙ˆk to zero. We obtain:
Cˆ = Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ (23)
mˆ
α
σ2
+1−α =
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1
δM + r
(24)
Mˆ =
pimˆα
δM
(25)
kˆ = B
1
1−ε
(
δ + ρ
ε
) 1
ε−1
(26)
The following proposition characterizes the solution of the system and the positivity of mˆ and
Cˆ.
Proposition 1 There is a unique solution mˆ to the Equation (24), with mˆ < Bkˆε − δkˆ.
Proof. The proof is quite intuitive. Indeed, the left hand side of the equation (24) is strictly
increasing in mˆ, while the right hand side is strictly decreasing, and the latter is equal to zero
when mˆ = Bkˆε − δkˆ and equal to ( δMpib )
1
σ2
bpiα(Bkˆε−δkˆ)σ1
δM+r
if mˆ = 0. Hence, there is a unique
solution mˆ to equation (24), with mˆ < Bkˆε − δkˆ which therefore means that mˆ and Cˆ are
always positive. ¤
3.4 Static comparative
In this section we study the static comparative of the model. We consider the effect of mod-
ifications in the parameters of the endogenous variables along the balanced growth path. We
will consider two cases: the case where B is independent of the determinants of health capital.
Then we examine an ad-hoc case where B is dependent on such determinants.
3.4.1 B independent of health capital
The following proposition characterizes the behavior of health investment and consumption with
respect to health depreciation rate.
Proposition 2 Health investment (resp. consumption) is a strictly increasing (resp. decreas-
ing) function of the health depreciation rate δM if and only if σ2 < 1 + ρδM . In contrast, savings
are unaltered by changes in δM .
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Proof. See appendix. ¤
Two comments are in order with respect to the above result. Firstly, the lower σ2, the less
marginal utility with respect to health capital (and thus to health investment) will drop if Mˆ
or mˆ is raised in response to the deterioration of health depreciation. Henceforth, low values of
σ2 are compatible with increasing health investments. In contrast, large values of σ2 are likely
to make the marginal welfare cost of such investment prohibitive.
Secondly, the larger δM , the lower the incentives to invest in health, compared to invest-
ment in physical capital (which depreciation is kept constant). This explains why the condition
for increasing health investment becomes more and more stringent when δM increases indefi-
nitely. Indeed, as δM rises, the range of the values of σ2 needed for increasing health investment
becomes smaller. It tends to ]0; 1] when δM tends to infinity. Now notice that the marginal rate
of investment in physical capital, that’s Bεkˆε−1 − δ, is unaffected by changes in δM . This is
due to the fact that when epidemics do not affect total factor productivity (B) in our model,
then gross investment iˆ is equal to δkˆ which is independent of δM . Therefore, in the steady
state, savings do not get modified by changes in δM . It follows that when σ2 < 1 + ρδM , the
rise in health investment in response to the epidemic shock is entirely paid by a decrease in
consumption, which goes in odds with Cuddington and Hancok (1994)’s working assumption.
Proposition 3 : When health productivity pi decreases, an increase in health investment occurs
if and only if σ2 < 1, while consumption decreases and savings remain unchanged. If σ2 = 1,
there is a neutral effect on the economic variables, and if σ2 > 1 health expenditure decreases.
Proof. See appendix. ¤
A few comments are in order here regarding the interpretation of the model. A decrease in pi has
two effects on health investment mˆ. On one hand, it decreases the efficiency of health investment
as featured in equation (25), therefore causing mˆ to drop. On the other hand, a lower pi increases
the marginal value of health capital relative to the marginal value of the consumption good as
one can notice in Equation (16), inducing an incentive to invest more in health capital. However,
since a marginal drop in mˆ is valued by the utility term M−σ2 , the negative effect will dominate
the positive one for σ2 high enough, here σ2 > 1. If σ2 = 1, there is just a compensation
between the two effects which yields a neutral impact. For low values of σ2 allowing investment
in health, the latter is always financed by a reduction in ordinary consumption, while savings
remain constant. An important finding from this model is the undeniable fact that face with an
epidemic shock, whether people reduce or increase their health expenditure, their saving remains
constant, and an increase in health investment is moderately financed by a reduction of their
consumption.
3.4.2 The case of productivity-decreasing epidemics
We now suppose that the productivity B depends on the health productivity pi and the health
depreciation rate δM in an ad-hoc way. We will assume (like Cuddington and Hancok, 1994) that
a decreasing health capital induces lower productivity. More precisely, we will assume that all
factors pushing down this capital has a negative effect on B. Therefore, we make the hypothesis
that the health productivity pi positively affects B, while the latter is negatively affected by δM .
The following result holds.
Proposition 4 Health investment (resp. consumption) increases (resp. decreases) in response
to the epidemic shock δM if and only if
σ2 <
1
1−BδMσ1kˆε(δM + r)(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)−1
+
ρ
δM − δMBδMσ1kˆε(δM + r)(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)−1
while savings always decrease.
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Proof. See appendix. ¤
This result is in line with the Proposition (2), however, it is worse in the case of health investment.
Indeed, if δM increases infinitely, instead of σ2 < 1 + ρδM , we now need σ2 in ]0;x[ with x =
1
1−BδM σ1kˆε(δM+r)(Bkˆε−mˆ−δkˆ)−1
< 1 to allow a rise in mˆ, where BδM =
∂B
∂δM
< 0. It happens
that the interval of evolution of σ2 which would favor mˆ is reduced by the additional resource
constraint through the productivity B. On the ordinary consumption side, when it occurs, the
increase in health expenditure is totally compensated by a fall in consumption (see proof in the
appendix). However, on the other side we observe a fall in the saving level, since the capital stock
is negatively affected through the negative effect of δM on the productivity B. Compared to the
case where the productivity B is not affected by the health parameters, at this point, to finance
an increase in health expenditure, in addition to the fall in consumption, savings drop because
of the loss of resources generated by the loss of productivity. Furthermore, if the epidemic has a
large effect (i.e. BδM → −∞), health investment will never increase (the necessary and sufficient
condition of proposition (4) tends to σ2 ≤ 0).
Proposition 5 A downshift of the health productivity pi is followed by an increase in health
investment if and only if σ2 < 11+Bpiσ1kˆεpi(Bkˆε−mˆ−δkˆ)−1 , meanwhile consumption and savings
decrease.
Proof. See appendix. ¤
Let us comment on the meaning of this result. The interval in which the values of σ2 are
favorable to an increase in health expenditure is now reduced. Indeed we now need σ2 <
1
1+Bpiσ1kˆεpi(Bkˆε−mˆ−δkˆ)−1 instead of σ2 < 1 to increase mˆ, where Bpi =
∂B
∂pi > 0. In other words,
from now on, even for σ2 in
]
1
1+Bpiσ1kˆεpi(Bkˆε−mˆ−δkˆ)−1 ; 1
]
a fall in pi is followed by a fall in mˆ. This
phenomenon is certainly due to the fact that the agent has also a resource problem. Indeed a fall
of pi, has a negative effect on the wages through the productivity B, thus reducing his financial
possibilities. In addition, given that there is also a negative impact on the gross investment
in physical capital, we can expect a reduction of saving. As in Proposition (4), a drop in
consumption and savings will make it possible to pay the increase in health expenditure.
To conclude this section, it is worth noting that while some studies like Cuddington and
Hancok (1994) showed that an increase in health expenditure is inevitably accompanied by a
decrease in savings, our study demonstrated that health expenditure can be fully financed by
a decrease in saving and consumption, or by a reduction of consumption while saving remains
unaltered. However, in this benchmark model, the determination of the relationship between
health investment (and therefore consumption and savings) and the health parameters δM and
pi entirely depends on the health elasticity σ2. This constraint may be due to the fact that
health and ordinary consumption enter utility in an additive way. Therefore, marginal utility of
consumption is independent of health capital and vice-versa. We develop hereafter an alternative
model where consumption is also a determinant factor of good health, as largely previously
explained.
4 An alternative model: The case of non-additive utility
We move from the above pattern, where consumption and health enter into the utility function
in an additive way. Remember that in the later case the marginal utility of consumption is
independent from health, and this does not fit in for instance with the notion that good nutrition
is also important for health. Indeed, undernutrition can affect quality of life, weaken resistance
to infection and diseases, and cause life expectancy to drop. Epidemics and malnutrition often
operate together. Indeed, poor nutrition increases the risk and progression of disease and in
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turn, disease exacerbates malnutrition. Evidence from Friis and Michaelsen (1998) suggested
that good nutrition and prompt treatment of infections in HIV infected individuals may delay
the onset of AIDS and reduce the progression of the disease. Also, healthy eating might lead to a
reduction in mortality from chronic diseases, and appropriate dietary advice can prevent physical
and mental deterioration, and improve the quality of life. Therefore, ordinary consumption is also
crucial for health. The alternative model we propose below seeks to account for this important
aspect.
4.1 Model set-up
The individual’s lifetime utility is now specified as follows:∫ ∞
z
V (C(z),M(z))e−ρsds =
∫ ∞
z
U(C(z))ϕ(M(z))e−ρsds (27)
In order for the function V (·) to fulfil the standard property of positive marginal utility, we
have to assume σ1 < 1, σ2 < 1. We disregard the case σ1 = σ2 = 1 because it imposes further
constraints on the values of economic variables. Indeed, when σ1 = 1, then VM = ln(C)ϕ′(M),
which requires C > 1. Therefore, we focus on the case σ1 < 1, σ2 < 1, which allows us to
compare results with the analogue benchmark model.
Individuals seek to maximize lifetime utility (27), which depends on a consumption stream
C(z) subject to the state variables A˙(z) and M˙(z) in Equations (5) and (6) respectively. The
hamiltonian of this problem is given by:
J = U(C(z))ϕ(M(z))e−ρz
+ λAe−ρz [r(z)A(z) + w(z)− C(z)−m(z)]
+ λMe−ρz [ψ(m(z))− δMM(z)]
The optimality conditions (FOC) are:
∂J
∂C(z)
= UCϕ(M(z))e−ρz − λAe−ρz = 0 (28)
∂J
∂m(z)
= λMψ′(m(z))e−ρz − λAe−ρz = 0 (29)
∂J
∂M(z)
= [λ˙M − ρλM ]e−ρz = λMδMe−ρz − U(C(z))ϕ′(M(z))e−ρz (30)
∂J
∂A(z)
= e−ρz[ρλA − λ˙A] = r(z)λAe−ρz =⇒ λ˙A = λA(ρ− r(z)) (31)
with the transversality conditions:
lim
z→∞λA(z)e
−ρzA(z) = 0 (32)
lim
z→∞λM (z)e
−ρzM(z) = 0 (33)
We use the same functional forms as in the benchmark set-up for U(C(z)), ϕ(M(z)) and ψ(m(z)).
However, for ϕ(M(z)), we get rid of the parameter b which is unimportant in what follows.
Equation (29) allows to find the shadow price λMλA = g(t) =
1
ψ′(m(z)) which is the unit value of
health capital. Moreover, a continuous stock equilibrium condition for health can be derived
from Equation (30):
λ˙M
λA
=
λM
λA
(ρ+ δm)− U(C(z))ϕ
′(M(z))
λA
(34)
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Combining Equations (31) and (34), we obtain:
g (δm + r − g˜) = 1
λA(0)
U(C(z))ϕ′(M(z))e
∫ z
0 (r(s)−ρ)ds (35)
with g˜ = g˙g and g =
1
piα(m(z))
1−α. Equation (35) states that the instantaneous user cost of
health capital should equal the instantaneous marginal benefit. The explicit expression of the
shadow price can be derived from Equation (35) as
g = g¯e
∞∫
z
(δm+r(s))ds
+
e
∞∫
z
(δm+r(s))ds
λA(0)
∫ ∞
z
[
U(C(v))ϕ′(M(v))e
∫ v
0 (r(s)−ρ)ds
]
e
−
∞∫
v
(δm+r(s))ds
dv (36)
where g¯ is an integration constant, reflecting the limit value of g when z tends to infinity
(assuming that such a limit value is finite). Equation (36) means that the value of health capital
is determined by the asymptotic value of life extension (the first term of the right-hand side),
and the value of healthy life or the discounted value of health benefits (second term).
We can now explore the connection between the path of health investment and the optimal
consumption over life cycle. Using Equation (28), we obtain λA = UCϕ(M(z)) and
λ˙A
λA
= ρ− r(z) = C˙(z)U
′
C
UC
+
M˙(z)ϕ′(M(z))
ϕ(M(z))
Then the path of the optimal consumption is:
C˙(z) = −UC
U ′C
(r(z)− ρ)− UC
U ′C
ϕ′(M(z))
ϕ(M(z))
M˙(z) (37)
The first term on the right-hand side is the slope of the consumption path times the difference
between the rate of interest and time preference. The second term reflects the interaction
between the individual’s health and his capacity to consume. Next we replace UC , U ′C and
ϕ′(M(z)) by their respective expressions in (37) for the elasticity parameters to show up:
C˙(z)
C(z)
=
1
σ1
(r − ρ) + 1− σ2
σ1
M˙(z)
M(z)
=
1
σ1
(r − ρ) + 1− σ2
σ1
(
ψ(m)
M(z)
− δM
)
(38)
In the typical Ramsey setup, we have the following optimal rule:22
r = ρ− U
′
CC
UC
C˙
C
This means that the interest rate should cover the impatience rate (or rate of time preference)
and the marginal utility loss as captured by the term −U ′CCUC C˙C , where
U ′CC
UC
is the elasticity of
marginal utility with respect to consumption. Equation (37) can be rewritten as:
r = ρ− U
′
CC
UC
C˙
C
− ϕ
′(M(z))
ϕ(M(z))
M(z)
M˙(z)
M(z)
In this model, the interest rate should also account for the possible loss or gain in health capital
due to any marginal change in consumption and savings. This reflects the dependence between
22The Keynes-Ramsey standard term known as the difference between the interest rate and the pure rate of
time preference.
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the (marginal) welfare impacts of consumption and health investment. We shall now extract the
optimal law of motion for health investment m. Using Equation (29), we obtain:
λ˙M
λM
=
λ˙A
λA
− m˙ψ
′′(m)
ψ′(m)
= ρ− r(z) + (1− α)m˙(z)
m(z)
(39)
From equation (30) we get
λ˙M
λM
= −U(C(z))ϕ
′(M)ψ′(m)
λA
+ δM + ρ
= −U(C(z))ϕ
′(M)ψ′(m)
UCϕ(M)
+ δM + ρ (40)
Combining these two equations yields the path of the optimal health investment:
m˙(z)
m(z)
=
r + δM
1− α −
U(C(z))
ϕ(M)
ϕ′(M)ψ′(m)
(1− α)UC (41)
= −1− σ2
1− σ1
piαmα−1
1− α
C(z)
M(z)
+
r + δM
1− α (42)
The next proposition states required concavity conditions for U(C) and ϕ(M).
Proposition 6 The Mangassarian sufficient conditions for our optimal control problem are
fulfilled if and only if σ1σ2(1−σ1)(1−σ2) − 1 > 0.
Proof. See appendix. ¤
4.2 Equilibrium
The dynamics of the economy is driven at equilibrium by the following system
˙ˆ
C(z)
Cˆ(z)
= 1σ1 (εBkˆ
ε−1
z − δ − ρ) + 1−σ2σ1
˙ˆ
M(z)
Mˆ(z)
˙ˆm(z)
mˆ(z) = −1−σ21−σ1 piαmˆ
α−1
1−α
Cˆ(z)
Mˆ(z)
+ 11−α(r + δM )
˙ˆ
M(z) = pi(mˆ(z))α − δMMˆ(z)
˙ˆ
kz = Bkˆεz − Cˆ − mˆ− δkˆz
(43)
with kˆ(0) and Mˆ(0) given, plus the transversality conditions. The steady-state values of Cˆ, mˆ,
Mˆ , and kˆ are obtained by equalizing ˙ˆC, ˙ˆm, ˙ˆM , ˙ˆk to zero. We therefore get:
Cˆ =
(δM + r) (1− σ1)B
1
1−ε
[(
δ+ρ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
δ+ρ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r) (44)
mˆ =
αδM (1− σ2)B
1
1−ε
[(
δ+ρ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
δ+ρ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r) (45)
Mˆ =
pimˆα
δM
(46)
kˆ = B
1
1−ε
(
δ + ρ
ε
) 1
ε−1
(47)
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Within the structure of the system, studying the stability properties analytically is simply un-
bearable. Instead, we resort to numerical simulations with a set of reasonable parameterizations
and the necessary corroborating sensitivity tests. We always end up with four eigenvalues with
two real negative parts and two real positive parts, suggesting that saddle path properties are
fulfilled.23
4.3 Comparative statics
We now elaborate on how the health parameters (δM , pi) affect the steady-state values, and
notably the health investment variable (mˆ), and the consequences on consumption, capital
stock and savings.
Proposition 7 Given condition of Proposition (6), a high health deterioration rate of health
causes health expenditure to increase, and the latter is fully financed by a fall in consumption,
and saving remains unaffected.
Proof. See appendix. ¤
Let us reiterate that with the benchmark model we get the same reaction only for σ2 low enough,
and more precisely when δM is high enough. On the contrary, in this case individuals react in
face of an epidemic shock by spending more on health, independently of the size of σ2, provided
that the concavity requirements stated in proposition (6) are fulfilled. Without doubt, under
the conditions of proposition (6) we have a positive effect of δM on mˆ. This positive effect can
be explained by the fact that in the alternative framework, the marginal utility of consumption
depends on health capital. Indeed, in order to enjoy consumption, one should be healthy,
and a deterioration of health now negatively affects the marginal utility drawn from ordinary
consumption. Therefore, one should invest more in health to maintain welfare optimal. This
increase is paid by a fall in consumption, and since the individual’s resources remain unchanged,
if not improved, then there is no impact on gross investment in physical capital and savings
remain constant.
Proposition 8 Given Proposition (6), the effect of a decrease in the health productivity pi on
health investment, consumption and savings is neutral.
Proof. The proof is intuitive. Indeed, a decrease in pi has two effects as in the benchmark
model: first, a fall in pi decreases the marginal efficiency of health investment, therefore pushing
this variable downward. But on the other hand, decreasing pi also increases the marginal value
of health capital relative to the marginal value of consumption, making it more desirable to
acquire. However, contrarily to the benchmark model where for high values of σ2 the negative
effect dominates the positive one, in this alternative model, the second effect just offsets the first
one. These two effects can be clearly identified in Equation (46) as well as the expression of the
unit value of health capital g = 1ψ′(mˆ) =
1
αpimˆα−1 . The rational of this neutral effect is that, here
a decrease in health expenditure in response to a lower pi (as it is the case in the benchmark
model) is more harmful, since in turn we will have a negative impact on the marginal utility of
consumption.
The conclusions emerging from the alternative model are different from those resulting
from the benchmark model. The foremost and common result from the two models is that
rising health expenditure does not always lead to a decrease in savings. However, while the
benchmark model results completely rely on the health elasticity σ2 as for the evolution of the
health investment mˆ in response to an epidemic shock, in the alternative model, an increase in
δM induces purely a growth in health expenditure. Moreover, we have a neutral effect when pi
decreases, without any elasticity constraint.
23To simplify presentation, we do not report simulation results. Results are available from the authors upon
request.
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4.4 The case of productivity-decreasing epidemics
As in the benchmark model, we take into account the epidemic shock in the household’s choices,
via the channel of the productivity. We then assume that the level of technology B(z) or the
productivity of individuals depends on the health parameters. We suppose a function B(δM , pi)
which depends on δM and pi. Then B is an increasing function in the health productivity pi, and
decreases with the health deterioration rate δM . Then, the following result can be highlighted
Proposition 9 The effect of health deterioration rate on health investment is positive if and
only if σ2 < 1 +
(1−σ1)[δMBδM (δM+ρ)+ρ(1−ε)]
αδ2MBδM
, and consumption and savings always decrease.
Proof. See appendix. ¤
In contrast to the case where the productivity B is independent of δM , here the optimality
of increasing health expenditure in the face of epidemics does depend on the values of σ1 and
σ2. Clearly, the negative effect on productivity has an adverse effect on income, which in turn
induces a decrease in ordinary consumption and health investment. Such effects can dominate
those pointed out in the previous subsection where B is independent of health parameters.
This can be clearly deduced from the necessary and sufficient conditions in Proposition (9). In
case of epidemics with a tenus productivity effect, that is when BδM is close to zero, the limit
condition becomes σ2 < ∞, that is mˆ will increase whatever elasticities’ values, provided that
the Mangassarian condition is checked. In contrast, if the epidemic has strong adverse effects
on productivity, say BδM → −∞, then the condition of Proposition (9) violates the Mangas-
sarian restriction in Proposition (6). Indeed, the limit condition becomes σ2 <
(1−σ1)(δM+ρ)
αδM
.
Therefore σ2 < 1 if and only if
(1−σ1)(δM+ρ)
αδM
< 0, which in turn implies that σ1 > 1. Although
the Mangassarian condition is a sufficient condition, the latter results mean that the range of
elasticities’ values yielding an increase in health expenditure in the face of epidemic will shrink
as the adverse productivity effect becomes tougher. On the physical capital side, due to the
negative effect on B, we have a fall in gross investment which causes savings to decrease. In this
case, the role of public health expenditure becomes crucial.
Proposition 10 In the presence of a decrease in pi, health expenditure increases if and only if
σ2 > 1. Thus health expenditure should drop when pi decreases in the alternative model, since
σ2 < 1 is imposed for marginal utility of M and C to be positive.
Proof. See appendix. ¤
According to Proposition (6), Proposition (10) completely violates the concavity condition.
Therefore, we cannot expect an increase in health expenditure when the health productivity
pi decreases. Indeed, the negative effect on the productivity undermines individuals resources,
forcing them to undercut their health investment, consumption and savings. Here, the negative
effect from the marginal efficiency of health dominates the positive one induced by the increase
in the unit value of health. Indeed, as featured in Equation (41), marginal utilities with respect
to M and C depend on the utility levels of C and M in this order (due to the non-separable
preferences). Therefore the negative effect of decreasing efficiency in the production of health
capital is magnified.
5 Summary of findings and comparison with prior studies
In this section, we summarize the key findings that emerge from our study. From an empirical
point of view, the estimation of the relation between life expectancy and health expenditure
shows a highly non-linear curvature. These findings cannot be obtained within the parametric
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specifications considered by Peltzman (1987), Miller and Frich (2000) and Shaw et al. (2005).
Our econometric specification allows us to estimate both the effects of current and lagged values
of health expenditure on life expectancy. While roughly increasing, the relation has quite varying
concavity depending on the value of health expenditure. It is clear that the effect of health
expenditure on life expectancy is less pronounced when the former is already high. Observe
that this finding is consistent with Shaw et al. (2005) who showed that the actual predicted
effect of pharmaceutical expenditure on life expectancy is decreasing in age. On the contrary,
we find that this effect is strong for intermediate values of health expenditure.
From the theoretical side, our findings can be gathered in two main strands.
i) When productivity is independent of health parameters
In the case of an acceleration of the health deterioration rate (δM ) (resulting for instance
from epidemic shock), in the benchmark model, the reaction of health investment entirely
relies on the elasticity of the marginal utility of health σ2. Low values of σ2 (or when δM
high enough) are compatible with increasing health expenditure, while high values of σ2
are likely to make the marginal welfare cost of such investment prohibitive. Indeed, the
lower σ2, the less marginal utility with respect to health capital will also drop. In the
alternative model, individuals react to such shock by increasing their health expenditure,
independently of the size of σ2. This behaviour can be interpreted by the fact that marginal
utility of consumption now depends on health capital.
When we consider a loss of health productivity, we have two effects. Firstly, a decrease in
health productivity (pi) induces a loss in health investment efficiency, which causes health
expenditure to drop. That’s what we call the negative effect. Secondly, a weak value of pi
increases the marginal value of health capital relative to the marginal value of consumption
goods, which in turn induces an incentive to invest in health. This is the positive effect.
In the benchmark model, the positive effect dominates the negative one for σ2 low enough,
while in the alternative model, one of the two effects compensates the other, and the
resulting impact is neutral.
However, in both models, regardless of the two kind of shocks, a relevant result is contrary
to that of Cuddington and Hancok (1994). They predicted a decrease in savings while
health expenditure increases. In our framework, irrespective of the increase in health
investment, savings remain unchanged. And in case it increases, the latter is fully financed
by a cut in consumption.
ii) When productivity depends on health parameters
In the benchmark model, a high rate of health deterioration induces an increase in health
expenditure only for very low values of σ2. In that case, if the epidemics have large
negative effects on productivity, health investment does not increase. However, in the
alternative model, findings depend on whether epidemics have tenuous or large effects on
productivity. In the former case, health expenditure will increase whatever the elasticities’
values. In the case of epidemics strongly affecting productivity, the range of elasticities’
values yielding an increase in health expenditure in face of an epidemic will shrink as the
adverse productivity effect becomes tougher.
With a loss of health productivity (a decrease in pi), while in the benchmark model we ob-
tain an increase in health expenditure for σ2 low enough, this expenditure should drop in
the alternative model (with multiplicative interaction between health and consumption).
Indeed, in the latter model, marginal utilities with respect to health capital and consump-
tion depend on the utility levels of consumption and health. Therefore, the negative effect
of decreasing efficiency in the production of health capital is magnified.
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Finally, when productivity depends on health parameters, an increase in health expendi-
ture is found to be accompanied with a loss in both consumption and savings, due to the
loss of productivity.
As evident from above, the assumption of Cuddington and Hancok (1994) is certainly not
fulfilled. An epidemic shock which stimulates increasing health expenditure and weakens the
income base, not only affects savings, but it also compromises the consumption capacity, as well
as the human and physical capital of the economy, and also undercuts the process of economic
development. In such cases, the role of public health expenditure becomes crucial in increasing
the average health level of individuals, which depends on the quality of the health sector, which
in turn depends on the amount of public resources devoted to this sector. This finding can be
linked in some sense to study of Hazan and Zoabi (2006) who incorporated health into a model
extending the basic Ben-Porath mechanism. The authors considered health and education as
integrated inputs in the production of human capital. The showed that increased health can not
only increase the return on quality but also the return on quantity so that the transition from
stagnation to growth becomes possible.
6 Conclusion
This paper addresses the issue of health, in interaction with problems in ordinary consumption
and physical capital investment caused by shocks undermining health capital accumulation. We
examine, in particular, the effects on the subsequent life cycle of long-lived epidemics with either
an acceleration of health capital deterioration, or a decrease in health investment efficiency. We
also address the question of the financing of health investment, that is, is an increase in health
expenditure always paid by a decrease in savings?
We thus develop a benchmark model in which we suppose, as usual, that consumption
and health capital enter utility in an additive way, namely the marginal utility of consumption
is independent of health and vice-versa. We also study an alternative model, where we consider
that ordinary consumption is also crucial for health. Indeed, undernutrition can adversely affect
quality of life, impair resistance to infection and diseases, and decrease the span of life. We show
that a shock undermining health which increases health expenditure and weakens the income
base, not only affects savings but also compromises the consumption capacity, the human and
physical capital of the economy, and undercuts the process of economic development. We also
show that the magnitude of these effects strongly depends on the assumed preferences.
Several challenges remain to be addressed, among which, i) the optimal choices of public
health policies, holding account the age structure of population, ii) the effects of a decrease
in mortality benefiting young people and/or old people, iii) the distortions entailed by private
health expenditure on savings, education and the productivity of agents in poor countries.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 2
With Equation (24) can be rewritten in terms of output as:
f = mˆ
α
σ2
+1−α −
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1
δM + r
= 0
Relying on the the implicit functions Theorem we obtain:
∂mˆ
∂δM
= −
∂f
∂δM
∂f
∂mˆ
=
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1
(
δM+r
σ2δM
− 1
)
(δM + r)
[
( ασ2 + 1− α)m
α
σ2
−α(δM + r) + σ1
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1−1
]
Now, observe that ∂mˆ∂δM > 0 if
δM+r
σ2δM
− 1 > 0, which means that σ2 < 1 + ρδM . Proceeding in the
same way with respect to Cˆ, we have:
∂Cˆ
∂δM
= −
∂f
∂δM
∂f
∂Cˆ
= −
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiαCˆσ1
(
δM+r
σ2δM
− 1
)
(δM + r)
[
( ασ2 + 1− α)m
α
σ2
−α(δM + r) + σ1
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1−1
]
In that case, if σ2 = σ1 = 1, and then:
mˆ =
δMbα(Bkˆε − δkˆ)
δM (1 + bα) + r
It follows that:
∂mˆ
∂δM
=
bα(Bkˆε − δkˆ) [δM (1 + bα) + r]− δMbα(Bkˆε − δkˆ)(1 + bα)
[δM (1 + bα) + r]
2
As a result, ∂mˆ∂δM > 0 if and only if r > 0, which is always justified, and
∂Cˆ
∂δM
= − ∂mˆ∂δM ¤
Proof of proposition 3
The derivative of mˆ with respect to pi is given by
∂mˆ
∂pi
= −
∂f
∂pi
∂f
∂mˆ
=
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1
(
1− 1σ2
)
( ασ2 + 1− α)m
α
σ2
−α(δM + r) + σ1
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1−1
Then ∂mˆ∂pi < 0 if and only if σ2 < 1, which ends the first part of the proof. Similarly, we have:
∂Cˆ
∂pi
= −
∂f
∂pi
∂f
∂Cˆ
= −
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1
(
1− 1σ2
)
( ασ2 + 1− α)m
α
σ2
−α(δM + r) + σ1
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1−1
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Therefore, ∂Cˆ∂pi > 0 if and only if σ2 < 1. If σ2 = σ2 = 1,
∂mˆ
∂pi =
∂Cˆ
∂pi = 0 ¤
Proof of proposition 4
Recall that we are dealing with the case of productivity B depending on health productivity
and pi and the health depreciation rate δM . Thus, we have
∂mˆ
∂δM
= −
∂f
∂δM
∂f
∂mˆ
=
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1
[
δM+r
σ2δM
− 1 +BδMσ1kˆε(δM + r)(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)−1
]
(δM + r)
[
( ασ2 + 1− α)m
α
σ2
−α(δM + r) + σ1
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1−1
]
It then follows that ∂mˆ∂δM > 0 if and only if
δM+r
σ2δM
− 1 +BδMσ1kˆε(δM + r)(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)−1 > 0,
that is σ2 < 11−BδM σ1kˆε(δM+r)(Bkˆε−mˆ−δkˆ)−1
+ ρ
δM−δMBδM σ1kˆε(δM+r)(Bkˆε−mˆ−δkˆ)−1
¤ Also,
∂Cˆ
∂δM
= −
∂f
∂δM
∂f
∂Cˆ
= −
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1
[
δM+r
σ2δM
− 1 +BδMσ1kˆε(δM + r)(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)−1
]
(δM + r)
[
( ασ2 + 1− α)m
α
σ2
−α(δM + r) + σ1
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1−1
] ¤
Proof of proposition 5
We have:
∂mˆ
∂pi
= −
∂f
∂pi
∂f
∂mˆ
=
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1
[
1− 1σ2 +Bpiσ1kˆεpi(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)−1
]
( ασ2 + 1− α)m
α
σ2
−α(δM + r) + σ1
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1−1
Then we can see easily that ∂mˆ∂pi < 0 if and only if 1− 1σ2 +Bpiσ1kˆεpi(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)−1 < 0, that
is σ2 < 11+Bpiσ1kˆεpi(Bkˆε−mˆ−δkˆ)−1 . Also,
∂Cˆ
∂pi
= −
∂f
∂pi
∂f
∂Cˆ
= −
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1
[
1− 1σ2 +Bpiσ1kˆεpi(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)−1
]
( ασ2 + 1− α)m
α
σ2
−α(δM + r) + σ1
(
δM
pi
) 1
σ2 bpiα(Bkˆε − mˆ− δkˆ)σ1−1
¤
Proof of proposition 6
The condition stated is obtained by establishing the concavity of the objective function in (C,M).
The concavity of the state functions and the positivity of λA and λM are straightforward. Using
the Hamiltonian
H = U(C(z))ϕ(M(z))e−ρz+λAe−ρz [r(z)A(z) + w(z)− C(z)−m(z)]+λMe−ρz [ψ(m(z))− δMM(z)]
it is straightforward to obtain with some calculus that the positivity of the determinant of the
Hessian matrix of the above Hamiltonian requires
C−2σ1M−2σ2
[
σ1σ2
(1− σ1)(1− σ2) − 1
]
> 0
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That is either σ1 < 1 and σ2 < 1 or σ1 > 1 and σ2 > 1 ¤
Proof of proposition 7
The proof is based on the sign of the derivatives ∂mˆ∂δM and
∂Cˆ
∂δM
. We have:
∂mˆ
∂δM
=
rαB
1
1−ε
[(
ρ+δ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
ρ+δ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
(1− σ2) (1− σ1)
[αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]2
> 0
and,
∂Cˆ
∂δM
= −
rαB
1
1−ε
[(
ρ+δ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
ρ+δ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
(1− σ2) (1− σ1)
[αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]2
< 0 ¤
Proof of proposition 9
We have:
∂mˆ
∂δM
=
αδM (1− σ2)B
ε
1−ε
[(
ρ+δ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
ρ+δ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
BδM [αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]
(1− ε) [αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]2
+
rαB
1
1−ε
[(
ρ+δ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
ρ+δ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
(1− σ2) (1− σ1)
[αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]2
and,
∂Cˆ
∂δM
=
(δM + r)M (1− σ1)B
ε
1−ε
[(
ρ+δ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
ρ+δ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
BδM [αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]
(1− ε) [αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]2
−
rαB
1
1−ε
[(
ρ+δ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
ρ+δ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
(1− σ2) (1− σ1)
[αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]2
< 0 ¤
Proof of proposition 10
The conditions ate checked for ∂mˆ∂pi , and
∂Cˆ
∂pi as:
∂mˆ
∂pi
=
αδM (1− σ2)B
ε
1−ε
[(
ρ+δ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
ρ+δ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
Bpi
(1− ε) [αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]2
So ∂mˆ∂pi < 0 if and only if 1− σ2 < 0, then σ2 > 1. Similarly,
∂Cˆ
∂pi
= −
(δM + r) (1− σ1)B
ε
1−ε
[(
ρ+δ
ε
) ε
ε−1 − δ
(
ρ+δ
ε
) 1
ε−1
]
Bpi
(1− ε) [αδM (1− σ2) + (1− σ1) (δM + r)]2
¤
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Life expectancy, health expenditure in % of GDP
Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Life expectancy
overall 63.14 11.50 31.22 79.99 nT = 2396
between 10.88 34.92 76.77 n = 201
within 3.81 39.39 77.82
Health expenditure
overall 5.47 2.27 .86 13.30 nT = 1762
between 2.12 1.35 12.93 n = 189
within .83 1.61 10.92
.
.
Life expectancy
29.0366 82.1763
.000126
.055142
.
.
Health expenditures
.405948 13.7581
.001709
.19556
Figure 1: Kernel density estimates. [left]: life expectancy. [right]: health expenditure in per-
centage of GDP.
.
Current health expenditures
1.229 13.3
−.043473
.044022
.
Lag of health expenditures
1.387 13.3
−.056612
.046348
Figure 2: Non-parametric estimation of health expenditure effects on life expectancy. The solid
line represents the non-parametric fit. Dashed lines are 95% bootstrap pointwise confidence
intervals. The straight solid line is the zero line. [left]: mˆ(xit); [right]: mˆ(xi,t−1).
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